An Accurate Diagnosis, But Is There a Cure? by Morse, Stephen J.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2011 
An Accurate Diagnosis, But Is There a Cure? 
Stephen J. Morse 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Science 
and Technology Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Morse, Stephen J., "An Accurate Diagnosis, But Is There a Cure?" (2011). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 
2665. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2665 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
  
 1 
Stephen J. Morse: An Accurate Diagnosis, But Is There A Cure?: An Appreciation of The 
Role of Science in Law by Robin Feldman 
HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 
 
An Accurate Diagnosis, But Is There A Cure?: An 
Appreciation of The Role of Science in Law by Robin 
Feldman 
STEPHEN J. MORSE∗ 
CITE AS: 3 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L. J. 157 
http://hstlj.org/content/vol3/iss1/ http://hstlj.org/content/vol3/iss1/v3i1morse.pdf 
 
Professor Robin Feldman has written a splendid and wise book on a timely and important 
topic: the role of science in law.1  The usual complaint about the relation of law and science is 
that the law insufficiently attends to and incorporates scientific discoveries, but Professor 
Feldman turns this criticism upside down.  Instead, her central thesis is that the law defers to 
science far too much either by cloaking legal criteria in scientific terms, thus avoiding hard and 
indeed intractable problems, or by deferring to scientific experts essentially to decide difficult 
cases.  She terms these the “internalization” and “externalization” strategies.  These are serious 
problems, according to RSL, because the law has an inevitably independent domain that 
addresses normative questions that science cannot resolve.  Moreover, most of the legal “action” 
will take place in the interstices between criteria, and science will not be helpful to legal 
evolution in those gaps.  Science can surely help legal decision makers resolve legal problems, 
but science cannot resolve them for the law.  In sum, legal abdication to science is fueled by a 
misguided hope of evading or solving difficult normative issues, but such false hopes cannot be 
realized and will interfere with sound legal judgment and policy.   
To support her thesis, Professor Feldman offers both a descriptive and a normative account 
of the law/science relation and complex, nuanced arguments.  RSL gives telling examples of 
both the internalizing and externalizing strategies, such as asking science to tell us when 
abortion is or is not acceptable during the gestational period, or using experts to solve 
environmental or antitrust problems.  She also shows that these tendencies in the law have 
existed for hundreds of years and have survived all the varying legal movements that have 
marked the march of jurisprudence, from before Langdell to Critical Legal Studies and into the 
current era.  I think she is quite right about the history. 
RSL argues for five theses, at least as I count them.  The first is a thesis about law that says 
that science cannot independently solve legal problems because the law’s problems involve 
questions about how we should live together.  Another way of putting this point is that legal 
criteria are devised for the law’s purposes and these are typically not the same as scientific 
goals.  This thesis is, I believe, largely self-evidently true despite the fantasy of many that if we 
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will only listen to the rational scientists, we will all be better off.2  Whether such utopianism is 
driven by biological science, such as genetics, psychological science, such as psychodynamic 
psychology, or social science, such as economics, it seldom works as we expect.  The ultimate 
questions are not scientific and the world is such a messy, complicated place that science is 
often not up to even the empirical tasks that law and social policy set for it.  To take a current 
example, there is an immense debate about whether solving the financial crisis will best be 
achieved by increasing government spending or by adopting fiscal austerity.  Equally 
prestigious economists diametrically disagree and there is simply no way to resolve the 
question because macroeconomics is not sufficiently understood.  
Law’s questions are matters of practical reason whereas science’s questions are matters of 
theoretical reason.  On the former issue, how to live together, science must generally fall silent.  
When it does not, it masks moral and political judgments with the white coat of the 
dispassionate investigator.  For example, which people with mental disorder should be excused 
from criminal behavior is a normative social, moral, political, and, ultimately, legal question.  It 
is decidedly not a scientific question, although valid information about the psychological 
functioning of a defendant who raised the insanity defense is surely helpful.  Every time my 
colleagues in forensic psychology and psychiatry opine as a matter of reasonable psychological 
or medical certainty that a defendant is or is not legally insane, they are insidiously doffing the 
white coat of the expert and donning the hat of the 13th juror. 
My only reservation about the first thesis involves cases in which there might be complete 
normative agreement that some fact should make a legal difference.  For example, suppose 
there was excellent, uncontested evidence that some pollutant increased the risk of cancer to 
some known degree and there was uniform normative agreement that at some level the risk 
was simply too high to permit that degree of pollutant in air or water.  In this case, it is easy to 
imagine a regulation that sets a specific, factual pollution limit.  This possibility does not 
undermine the general validity of RSL’s first normative thesis, however, and such “pure” cases 
of factual and normative agreement are likely to be few. 
Professor Feldman’s second thesis is about science.  RSL repeatedly argues that science is 
not nearly as objective as law and the ordinary person think.  She adduces arguments from 
history and from deflationary philosophers of science, many of whom, I fear, are treated too 
deferentially.  I believe that RSL’s social constructivism and critique of objectivity go 
unnecessarily far.  Indeed, RSL is ambivalent about the strong form of this relativist claim, as 
well it should be.  Of course, we have to use a language to describe our scientific theories and 
facts and thus science is based on constructs.  And of course perception is theory and 
instrument driven.  And of course established science can be overturned by better theory and 
evidence or by seemingly irrelevant social or political considerations.  But these truisms do not 
mean that there are not important facts about the world that we have sound warrant to believe.  
There is a real, physical world that is mind independent and this matters.   
Professor Feldman appreciates this when she approvingly quotes David Faigman’s correct 
assertion that “brute reality constrains the courts.”3  I would add that it constrains all human 
life.  We all depend upon the objective nature of our physical world.  No one could possibly live 
as if all our justified beliefs were just “socially constructed.”  It would be paralyzing.  Scientists 
successfully engage in research that contributes to understanding, predicting, and changing the 
physical (and non-physical) world.  They do so unhindered and untroubled by misreadings and 
over-readings of the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn, by the writings of critical 
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philosophers of science generally, and by fears about lack of objectivity.  A gene may be just a 
segment on a DNA chain that we have identified for our purposes, as RSL claims, but “knock 
out” experiments, in which specific genes are disabled, show that they do incredibly precise 
work.  For another example, the laws of aerodynamics may be “just” constructs, but when a 
professor on her way to the next critical theory conference starts the roll down the runway, she 
rightly expects those laws not to change.   
All RSL needed to make its case was the completely unobjectionable claim that science is 
often not as certain as non-scientists and scientists think.  I hope that RSL will not lose otherwise 
sympathetic and persuadable readers because it overclaims about the non-objectivity of 
science.4  These claims are “crit tics,” which are boilerplate-type observations arising from 
critical theory.  I can hardly blame Professor Feldman for them, however.  After all, she was 
educated at Stanford Law School in the 80s, which was a hotbed of the importation of critical 
theory into legal studies.  Many were infected, but I trust this is a disorder from which she and 
others will ultimately recover.  In any case, as mentioned, the strong form of the critique is an 
unnecessary premise in her overall argument. 
Professor Feldman’s third normative thesis is about the fit between science and law and 
involves two related subparts.  The first is that science is not well-adapted to law’s evolutionary 
and adaptive processes, and, second, as a result, science will consistently be misused.  I agree 
with this thesis.  It is certainly correct historically and conceptually.  What is more, it is 
inevitable.  Once again, law and science ask different types of questions for different purposes.  
Why would one ever expect a very good fit?  I would only add that science is seldom performed 
for the purpose of answering legal questions, and, as Professor Feldman notes, law is always a 
moving target.   
Professor Feldman properly characterizes the fit problem as one of “translation” and uses 
the current rage for importing neuroscience into law as an illustration.5  To broaden this apt 
example, comparison to the use of psychiatry and psychology in criminal law is instructive.  
Criminal law is thoroughly based on folk psychology, which explains behavior in part by 
mental states.  Mental states play a crucial role in culpability and competence evaluations and 
proof.  Psychology and psychiatry translated uneasily because these fields straddle folk 
psychological and mechanistic modes of explanation.  Sometimes they treat human beings as 
actors in a folk psychological narrative and sometimes as pieces of organic meat.  The former 
type of explanation translated reasonably well and the latter did not, and, alas, practitioners 
often became confused by which type of analysis applied.  Neuroscience, by contrast, is 
thoroughly mechanistic, and it is not at all clear how it would translate to concepts and 
doctrines of criminal responsibility.6  It might provide markers for legal criteria, but the validity 
of these markers would depend on their being reliably and validly associated with legal criteria.  
Identification of such accurate markers would then hinder legal evolution, an outcome that RSL 
decries.  Most normative legal criteria shift over time, but the markers will have been validated 
at just one point in time.  If they are relied on in place of normative judgment, the norm cannot 
easily evolve. 
The fourth thesis attempts to explain why the law so often uselessly attempts to delegate 
the hard normative questions to science.  This thesis is a descriptive and normative mix.  
Professor Feldman argues that the law is insecure about its own authoritative status and its 
ability to resolve our disputes.  Consequently, we turn to science to solve those problems.  I 
should add that scientists are frequently arrogant in their belief that they have the answers to 
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non-scientific, social questions.  For example, some neuroscientists have argued that the 
criminal law should jettison “unscientific” notions like desert and should move instead to a 
consequentially-based prediction/prevention scheme of social control.7  Indeed, they sometimes 
argue that neuroscientific understanding entails consequentialism, but the extreme reductivism 
that underlies such claims may destroy the possibility of normativity altogether.  If we are 
“merely victims of neuronal circumstances,” which one influential article claimed,8 then what 
genuine reason do we have to prefer any type of morals or politics?  Finally, as further 
confirmation of Professor Feldman’s historical thesis, this claim is not new to neuroscience.  Dr. 
Karl Menninger, a famous American psychiatrist in the mid-20th Century, made precisely the 
same claim based on what psychiatry had allegedly discovered about human behavior. 9  
I believe that this type of scientific arrogance is fueled by technical expertise that is so often 
beyond the ken of non-scientists and lawyers are frequently cowed by it.  Consequently, turning 
to science for legal answers is not all law’s fault.  But RSL’s claim about the law’s insecurity and 
search for clarity just brings us back to the first three theses.  Of course science is often unable 
fully to solve our problems because the law’s questions are normative, science is often not as 
certain as we would wish, and the law/science fit is poor.  Professor Feldman’s diagnosis and 
malignant prognosis are inevitably and precisely right. 
The fifth thesis is that science does have a proper supporting role to play as legal decision 
makers decide what reasons they have to act.  The scientists must operate within law’s 
parameters, however, and should not be permitted to complain when we cabin them because 
the law’s purposes differ from those of science.  I agree yet again.  Let me offer one example 
from my own experience.  I have argued consistently for decades that the use of psychiatric 
diagnoses in the courtroom is more prejudicial and confusing than probative.  In one quite 
public forum, a prominent forensic psychiatrist admonished me by saying that doctors provide 
diagnoses and I had to let doctors be doctors.  My response was that diagnoses might be useful 
in the clinic and in the literature, but they were a distraction in legal cases. 
RSL offers general and specific recommendations for properly limiting the role of science in 
legal decision making.  As examples of the former, RSL suggests that science can test the law’s 
empirical assumptions, but we must protect the law’s folk psychological and normative dialog 
by insuring that experts speak in a jargon-free language that clarifies rather than obfuscates.  
And the law must be confident enough to embrace imperfection.  RSL also has specific 
recommendations for how to keep science in its proper supporting role.  Some are more 
persuasive than others, but quibbles are not the point.  The law will have to tinker, and whether 
any bit of tinkering seems successful will be decided by experience and not a priori.   
Professor Feldman is clearly on the right track for the right reasons, but I fear that RSL’s 
primary diagnosis rooted in her first four theses will limit the efficacy of any attempt to 
constrain the law’s misuse of science.  Science will continue to be misused because, as RSL 
convincingly explains, the law’s problems are normative and so difficult, science is not as 
certain as we would like and so beguiling, the fit is not good, and the law is insecure.  We can 
do better using science, but I fear that the problems will increase because science will gain ever 
increasing authority as it improves our ability to understand, predict, and control the world 
around us and ourselves.  
Let me conclude with a very recent example of precisely the problems Professor Feldman 
has identified and that suggest little will change.  In Graham v. Florida,10 the Supreme Court held 
that the 8th and 14th Amendments prohibited imposing a sentence of life without the possibility 
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of parole [LWOP] on juvenile offenders who had committed non-homicide crimes, thus 
overturning such laws in 37 states and the federal system.  In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme 
Court had already held that capital punishment was unconstitutional for juveniles who 
committed capital crimes when they were 16 or 17 years old.11  The Roper majority reached this 
conclusion primarily because juveniles on average were not as rational as adults, a common 
sense observation that more rigorous behavioral investigation had confirmed.12  Because 
adolescents are less rational, they are less responsible and do not deserve the death penalty.  
Although urged by amici to cite neuroscience evidence demonstrating that on average late 
adolescent brains are biologically less mature than adult brains, the Court did not do so, except, 
perhaps, indirectly, and it was unnecessary.  The criteria for responsibility are mental and 
behavioral and it was already clear that adolescents are less rational on average.  Even the 
behavioral science was unnecessary to reach that conclusion, but at least the behavioral science 
was directly relevant to the law’s criteria, which the neuroscience largely was not.13 
In Graham, the majority relied on Roper’s conclusion that adolescents are relevantly 
different, but cited amicus briefs for the proposition that the adolescent brain was not yet fully 
mature.14  It did so to support its conclusion that nothing in the science of adolescent 
development in the intervening five years changed the Roper conclusion, but no one had argued 
to the contrary.  Arguments in support of juvenile LWOP in non-homicide cases were based 
entirely on other normative and empirical arguments.  Citing the neuroscience was not 
necessary and was unresponsive.  This was a blatant attempt to do just what Professor Feldman 
criticizes: To use science in an extremely difficult moral and legal case to bolster a conclusion 
that the neuroscience was not necessary to reach. 
Professor Feldman has provided an accurate and unsettling diagnosis of the law’s misuse 
of science.  Diagnosis is often a royal road to cure, but sometimes the patient is incurably ill 
with the disease the diagnosis accurately identifies.  I fear that the legal patient in this case is 
incurably, but let us hope not terminally, ill. 
Professor Feldman has written a compelling, illuminating book.  I wish I had written it 
myself.  
 
                                                           
 ∗  Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School and School of Medicine.  This paper was first presented at a mini-symposium at the Hastings 
College of Law to celebrate the publication of Professor Feldman’s book.  As always, I thank my personal attorney, Jean 
Avnet Morse, for her sound, sober counsel and moral support. 
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